INTRODUCING INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE (EKC): A LATIN AMERICAN STUDY by ITALO ARBULÚ VILLANUEVA
Annals of the „Constantin Brâncuşi” University of Târgu Jiu, Economy Series, Issue 1/2012 
Annals of the „Constantin Brâncuşi” University of Târgu Jiu, Economy Series, Issue 1/2012 
INTRODUCING INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
KUZNETS CURVE (EKC): A LATIN AMERICAN STUDY 
 
ITALO ARBULÚ VILLANUEVA 
Senior Economist  
Málaga-Webb & Asociados 
iarbulu@malaga-webb.com 
 
 
Abstract: 
Several studies have examined the relationship between environmental degradation and per capita income. 
However, most of them did not take into account institutional quality and just focused on macroeconomic 
determinants. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by assessing the effects on the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) when institutional quality variables are introduced, especially those related to 
corruption and rent-seeking behavior. 
This study considers 18 Latin American economies and panel data for 1998–2005.  A standard reduced-
form modeling approach with pool estimation was employed and, in order to introduce the heterogeneity of the 
different countries, three different models were estimated. The first model corresponds to the basic Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (Basic Model), the second model introduced a sets of additional economic variables (Extended 
Model Nº 1), and finally, the third one introduced institutional variables into the previous formulation (Extended 
Model Nº 2).   
The expected results from this investigation lead us to support the EKC hypothesis while confirming the 
importance of improvements in political institutions and governance for better environmental performances in the 
region.  
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1.Introduction 
The relationship between environmental degradation and economic growth has received increasing 
attention in recent years due to evident impacts of climate change on human economic activities and life quality.  
A key policy objective of international efforts to mitigate adverse effects of global climate change is to 
reduce global CO2 emissions. The success of these efforts depends on a large degree of commitment by major CO2 
producing nations to reach global emissions targets.  This is the reason why it is so important to understand the main 
variables which impact over the CO2 emissions.  
Over the last years several studies used the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis to assess the impact of 
several economic variables on certain environmental indicators.  The Environmental Kuznets Curve is a 
hypothesized relationship between several indicators of environmental degradation and per capita income.  This 
model states that in the early stages of economic growth, degradation and pollution increases, but after achieving a 
certain level of per capita income this trend reverses (showing an inverted U-shape relationship).  
 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve is a “reduced form” relationship in which the level of pollution is 
modeled as a function of per capita income without specifying the links between both of them.  Grossman and 
Krueger (1995) characterize these missing links as “environmental regulations, technology and industrial 
composition”
1.  
According to Deacon and Mueller (2004) there are four ways in which a nation’s political system is linked 
to the way its natural resources and environmental assets are used:  
1.  When property rights related to resources are weak, competition can be wasteful and characterized by rent-
seeking and violent conflict. The link to political systems shows up because ownership claims are most 
likely to be weak or ambiguous in countries where the rule of law is not well-established. 
2.  When a country’s political system is unstable or non-representative, the individual’s claim to a resource 
stock’s future return can be rendered insecure. This reduces the payoff to natural resource conservation, 
leading to faster depletion of resource stocks.  
3.  When a country’s natural resources or environmental services are capable of generating significant rents, 
but institutions of democratic governance and the rule of law are not well-established, corruption by 
government officials can encourage rent-seeking behavior, dissipating the benefits those resources or 
environmental services would otherwise confer.  
 
4.  The mix of private versus public good outputs produced by a nation’s natural resources may be affected by 
its political system. When a country’s government does not represent the interests of the entire population, 
                                                            
1 For further references see Torras, M. and Boyce, J. (1998). 
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but rather acts on behalf of a select group, the use of resource stocks to provide public good amenities may 
be under-emphasized. 
Creating property rights that provide incentives for efficient use of natural resources and environmental 
conservation requires that economic agents are able to cooperate and promote a State that is able to enforce rules in 
order to solve market failures and avoid opportunistic behavior. The ability to cooperate, promote and enforce rules, 
however, depends on the political. 
This previous ideas will provide the starting point for this study. The main objective of this paper is to 
assess possible impacts of changes in institutional quality indices and income on the environment using the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis for a sample of 18 Latin American countries.    
This region was chosen because of the important contribution that natural resources and environmental 
services have on the productive structure of these countries.  Furthermore, in this region several institutional 
performance indicators are considered fairly low compared to developed countries. Both characteristics explain why 
this region is one of the most interesting locations to analyze the potential impact of institutional improvements on 
environmental quality. 
Previous studies have attempted to measure the impact of democracies on economic behavior; however, 
these studies focused their attention on measuring just a unique qualitative variable which is a democratic index
2 but 
little attention was given on the performance and effectiveness of these democracies (institutional quality).   
Section 1 of this paper briefly summarizes the theory behind the Environmental Kuznets Curve; Section 2 
introduces main theories that tend to explain how institutions relate with environmental outcome and how rent-
seeking behavior allocates resources in a different way than the social optimum desired level. Section 3 reviews the 
methodology used for the empirical analysis, and Section 4 presents the data sources and variables required to 
achieve the goals of this paper.  Finally, Section 5 and Section 6 show the main empirical results and conclusions.  
 
2.The environmental kuznets curve 
Grossman and Krueger, among others, found that for a number of environmental variables, the relationship 
between per capita income and environmental degradation takes an inverted U-shaped form, this means that 
environmental quality initially worsens but ultimately improves with income. This apparent empirical relationship 
has been called the “Environmental Kuznets Curve” because of its similarity to the relationship between per capita 
income and income inequality first suggested by Simon Kuznets in 1955
3.  
The Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis is intended to represent a long-term relationship between 
environmental impact and income. As Stern (2004) mentioned, the relationship between per capita income and 
environmental quality depends on scale, composition and technology effects.  
  As economic development accelerates, at the take-off stage, the rate of resource depletion begins to exceed 
the rate of resource regeneration, and waste generation increases in quantity and toxicity (scale effect). Therefore, 
we would expect environmental quality to worsen with income, as greater output generates more pollution.  
On the other hand, environmental quality could improve with income if this scale effect were eclipsed by 
the combination of the two other effects. With increasing per capita income, the composition of output shifts among 
sectors which differ in their pollution intensity (for instance, the service sector may grow relative to the 
manufacturing sector), generating a “cleaner” economic structure (composition effect).  Furthermore, several sectors 
of the economy may adopt less polluting technologies, either because of market driven technological advance or by 
government regulation (technological effect). 
Therefore, at higher levels of development, structural change of the economy coupled with increased 
environmental awareness, enforcement of environmental regulations, better technology and higher environmental 
expenditures, leads to a gradual decline of environmental degradation as income increases.  
 Grossman and Krueger likewise speculated that the strongest link between income and pollution is, in fact, 
via an induced policy response and these policies are in turn induced by popular demand: As nations or regions 
experience greater prosperity, their citizens demand that more attention should be paid to the non-economic aspects 
of their living conditions. Therefore, richer countries would have relatively more stringent environmental standards 
and stricter enforcement of their environmental laws than the middle-income and poorer countries.  
The public-good character of environmental quality means that, in fact, public demand is a requirement of an 
effective solution to a market failure. Implicit in such policy-based explanations of the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve, then, there is a theory of induced innovation: As per capita income rises, societies improve their abilities to 
redress market failure.  
 
3.The importance of institutions to solve environmental problems 
Payne (1995) has probably provided part of the most comprehensive theoretical treatise in favor of a 
positive impact of democracy on the environment. He argued that in democracies citizens are better informed about 
environmental problems (freedom of press) and can better express their environmental concerns and demands 
                                                            
2 Most of these studies use the Freedom House index which measure if a country is more or less democratic following just 
the perception on Civil Liberties and Political Rights inside the country.  For additional information about these studies see Bhattarai, 
M. and Hammig, M. (2001), Culas, R. (2007), Neumayer, E. (2002) and Robbins, P. (2000). 
3 For further references see Anand, S. and Kanbur, S. (1993).  
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(freedom of speech), which will facilitate an organization of environmental interests (freedom of association), which 
will in turn increase pressure on policy entrepreneurs operating in a competitive political system to respond 
positively to these demands (freedom of vote), both domestically as well as via international cooperation.  
On the other hand, in non-democratic systems, governments are likely to restrict the access of their 
population to information, restrict the voicing of concerns and demands, and restrict the organization of interests and 
isolate them-selves from the citizen’s preferences.  
In other words, in democracies if citizens are concerned about environmental problems, this will eventually 
require policymakers to exhibit stronger environmental commitment to address these concerns and honors the 
demand for environmental protection measures.  
However, democracies with emphasis on private property rights and individual liberty provide the 
opportunities for individuals and businesses to make full use of their potential to expand production and 
consumption, which, if not sufficiently counteracted by environmental regulation, will increase pressure on the 
environment. This means, that the quality of democratic regimens are in fact important to achieve sustainable 
growth. 
However, while a good theoretical case can be made for a positive link between democracy and 
environment, there are a number of considerations pointing in the opposite direction
4. The link between democracy 
and environment is therefore a complex one and there is still debate about it.  
 
3.1.Corruption as an institutional problem 
All political regimens have faced corruption, even the most ancient ones.  In democracies this problem 
takes increasing importance since it harms all the positive effects of this political system.  In this sense, in the 
presence of corruption policymakers and public officers
5 take actions which are different from the social 
commitment they are working for. 
For the purposes of this paper, corruption in natural resource and environmental management could be 
described using the definition of Robbins (2000) as “the use or overuse of community natural resources with the 
consent of a state agent by those not legally entitled”.  
It is expected that the more regulated an economy is and the larger the amount of resources administered by 
the government are, the higher will be the potential rents in the hands of public officials related to corruption.  In 
this sense, public sector corruption serves the private interests of bureaucrats and criminals by taking away from 
citizens their rights to live in a clean environment, misallocating environmental resources, and diverting funds from 
conservation and preservation.  
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) established a model in which a producer lobby attempts to influence the 
incumbent government’s environmental policy by offering prospective bribes (established as “political 
contributions”). In this model, the incumbent weighs bribes and the aggregate social welfare derived from the 
outcomes of environmental policies.  
The model examines the incentives of an incumbent government and a single producer lobby group in a 
three-stage model. The predictions that emerge are that the effect of corruption on the stringency of environmental 
policy is conditional on the degree of political instability. Corruption reduces the stringency of environmental 
regulations, but the effect is reduced as the degree of political instability increase, therefore the incentive to offer a 
bribe is reduced when its expected return falls. 
An increase in political instability has two opposing partial effects. First, bribery becomes less attractive for 
the producer lobby because the likelihood that the government remains in office throughout the policy 
implementation stage is reduced, and thus the bribe becomes less likely to pay off. This effect of instability is 
particularly pronounced when the level of corruption is high.  
However, this previously mentioned effect is counterbalanced by the fact that the government now sees 
bribes as relatively more attractive
6. The government is now less likely to be in office during the policy 
implementation stage, and thus the probability is lower that it will derive utility from its own policy choices. This 
effect of instability is strongest when the degree of corruption is low. The net impact of political instability on 
environmental policy thus depends on the level of corruption. 
Another important contribution to the theoretical approaches regarding to the impact of corruption (or rent-
seeking behavior) in environmental outcomes was introduced by López and Mitra (2000) that proposed a model 
were it is considered that the only goal of political parties is to repeat the rewards of holding office (win the 
elections).   
Under the assumption of rent-seeking behavior, to the model assumes that the government maximizes a 
function which depends on its probability of being re-elected as well as on rents. As a conclusion for this model, the 
authors state the following proposition for a cooperative scenario:  
“If corruption takes the form of cooperative government-private sector interactions, then: (i) pollution 
levels will be above the socially optimal levels for any level of income; (ii) an inverted-U-shaped relationship 
                                                            
4 For further references see Leff (1964). 
5 Those in charge of enforcement of policies. 
6 Similar results than the theoretical model developed by Damania, R., Fredriksson, P. and List, J. (2003). 
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between income and pollution will exist; (iii) the turning point of the inverted U-shaped curve will occur at a higher 
per capita income (and higher pollution level) than in the socially optimal equilibrium”.  
On the other hand, in the case of a non-cooperative scenarios the authors state the following proposition: 
“If government corruption takes the form of a non-cooperative Stackelberg interaction between the 
government and the firm, with the latter as a leader, and payment functions are linear in output, then: (i) pollution 
is always above the social optimum for any level of per capita income; (ii) a turning point in the pollution per capita 
income relationship always exists as long as a turning point exists in the socially optimal pollution-income 
relationship, but such a point is likely to occur at a higher per capita income (and higher pollution level) than the 
socially optimal one”.  
It is striking that, despite the assumed behavior of firms and government, these two scenarios derived 
results highly consistent.  This means that irrespective of the type of interaction between the firm and the 
government, for any level of per capita income, pollution levels are always above the socially optimal level when 
corruption exists. 
   The authors also argued that unless economic growth process brings about a rapid reduction of corruption 
in developing countries, pollution will remain much higher in these countries than the levels reached in currently 
developed ones even when their per capita incomes were comparable. 
Therefore, one of the main consequences of corruption is related to the fact that it leads to ecologically 
unsustainable resource use. This is the reason why governments should take into account the reduction of corruption 
as an alternative to reduce the negatives externalities produced by inefficient resource allocation. 
 
4.Methodology 
The main goal of this work is to test if institutional variables are explanatory variables of environmental 
performance.  Therefore, an appropriated econometric technique would be needed to assess the relationship between 
performance of those governments perceived as less connected with society needs and more corrupt and an 
environmental quality indicator.    
Several previous empirical studies use cross-country data to measure, among other factors, the relationship 
between income and environmental degradation
7.  However, these models implicitly assumed that a common 
structure exists across all countries at a certain period. 
In recent years it has been possible to obtain statistics that combine cross-sectional data observed for a 
considerable time sized period; this is one of the reasons that explain the increase of researches and economic 
studies which use panel data methodology. 
Comparing the information provided by a panel with the information given by only cross-sectional or time 
series sample, some differences can be found that help to identify the main advantages that, from the econometric 
modeling point of view, the use of this information combined offers.  
The first advantage of panel data is that it provides more information, more variability, less collinearity 
among variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency; all of these elements are the main limitations of 
many studies which used cross-sectional or temporal information only.  
A second advantage of this methodology is related to the fact that panel data suggest that individuals, 
families, businesses, states or regions analyzed are heterogeneous. The cross-sectional data only (or just cannot) 
control the temporal heterogeneity, this means that there is the risk of not taking into account all the information and 
the final results could be a biased parameter.  
  A third advantage of panel data methodology is that it allows a more precise analysis of the dynamics of 
adjustment of economic variables. These concepts are difficult to measure in cross-section and time series analysis 
separately
8. 
Due to all this reasons, this paper will use panel data methodology following standard approaches in the 
existing Environmental Kuznets Curve literature.  Given that the dataset used in this paper have a reduce amount of 
temporal dimensions, long run effects will not be capture in an adequate way by fixed and random effect models.  
Therefore, the use of panel data (pool estimation) with the introduction of specific economic variables (additional 
explanatory variables) is the best way to model the differences in behavior across countries
9.   
The methodology proposed in this paper involves the estimation of three models: 
•  BASIC MODEL: This model is established by regressing CO2 emission on GDP per capita and GDP per 
capita squared. This specification enables the estimation of the Environmental Kuznets Curve in its purest 
form. 
•  EXTENDED MODEL N° 1: This model considers additional explanatory variables that should allow the 
assessment of the effect on the Environmental Kuznets Curve of economics variables which might capture 
cross-country differences. 
                                                            
7 The initial empirical studies on EKC used this type of econometric analysis. 
8 For further references see Balestra, P. and Nerlove M. (1966). 
 
9 For further information see Nilsson (2008). 
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•  EXTENDED MODEL N° 2: This model includes institutional quality indexes as additional explanatory 
variables on the EXTENDED MODEL N° 1 in order to assess the impact of these variables on the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve. 
Under the hypothesis of no correlation between the exogenous variable and the individual effect, the panel 
data models can be estimated directly by ordinary least squares (OLS).  However, the main problem in this is that 
the model error generates a high probability of autocorrelated and heteroscedastic behavior, with a consequent 
impact on the efficiency property of the estimator
10.   Therefore the need for a general estimation (because the 
variance-covariance matrix is no longer a scalar matrix) rises. 
In this sense, White
11 supplied a method to correct asymptotic variance estimator that was applied to the panel 
models by means of the econometric software (E-Views).   
Finally, it should be addressed that complete panels of data could not be obtained for all countries in the dataset. 
This is a common problem with panel data and can be corrected by using balanced panel estimation methods.  
 
5.  Data 
Our data sources are several international institutions such as the World Bank (WB
12), Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Freedom House, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Economic Commission for Latin-American and the Caribbean (ECLAC).   
The dependent variable under consideration is carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (measured in metric tons per 
capita) which are those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement. The dataset for 
CO2 emissions is composed of measurements for several Latin American countries between the years 1998 to 2005.  
The following table shows the list of countries included in the estimation
13 and the codes which identify these 
countries in each institution from where the data was taken. 
 
TABLE N° 01 
SET OF LATIN AMERICAN COUTRIES 
 
The panel includes a wide range of macro-level information on socioeconomic characteristics of countries.  
The variables are shown in the following table which contains the definition and an explanation of those variables. 
 
TABLE N° 02 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
                                                            
10 For further references see Breusch, T., Mizon, G. and Schmidt, P. (1989). 
11 For further information about these tests see Arcarons, J. and Calonge, S. (2008). 
12 World Development Indicators Online Database. 
 
13 Not all Latin American countries could be included in this study due to lack of an appropriate dataset for all the 
relevant variables related to the purpose of the research. 
Country COD FAO COD WB COD IMF
Argentina 9 ARG 213
Bolivia 19 BOL 218
Brasil 21 BRA 223
Colombia 44 COL 233
Costa Rica 48 CRI 238
Chile 40 CHL 228
Ecuador 58 ECU 248
El Salvador 60 SLV 253
Guatemala 89 GTM 258
Honduras 95 HND 268
México 138 MEX 273
Nicaragua 157 NIC 278
Panamá 166 PAN 283
Paraguay 169 PRY 288
Perú 170 PER 293
República Dominicana 56 DOM 243
Uruguay 234 URY 298
Venezuela (República Bolivariana de) 236 VEN 299
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Per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDPPC) is used as a proxy for the per capita income of a country. 
Additional country specific data is gathered in order to control possible influences of these national characteristics in 
explaining CO2 emissions.  
For the purpose of this work a set of recent institutional indexes constructed by the World Bank
14 is used in 
order to assess the main characteristics a democracy should have through aggregate indicators.  Even though this 
institution estimates indicators related to six dimensions of governance, three of them: PSI (Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/ Terrorism Index), VAI (Voice and Accountability Index) and CCI (Control of Corruption 
Index) are of main interest for the purpose of this paper. 
 
5.Empirical finding 
The estimation of the so called “Basic Model” results from regressing CO2 emission (our environmental 
variable) on GDP per capita (GDPPC) and GDP per capita squared (GDPPC^2). This specification allows the 
estimation of the Environmental Kuznets Curve in its purest form.    
The Basic Model estimation gave the expected results with expected sign and statistically significance of 
both coefficients which led to confirm the quadratic form of the Environmental Kuznets Curve in its traditional 
theoretical formulation. 
 
Even though the countries in the sample came from the same region (Latin America) some heterogeneity 
across them should be expected. Therefore, the “Extended Model” is used then to assess the impact on the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve when additional explanatory variables (which might capture cross-country 
differences) are included. 
For the Extended Model two different versions were estimated: (i) “Extended Model Nº 1” will include the 
basic Environmental Kuznets Curve formulation and a set of additional economic variables; (ii) “Extended Model 
Nº 2” includes a set of institutional variables taken into the previous model in order to assess the impact of 
government performance on the Environmental Kuznets Curve. 
The following table shows the estimation results for the three models: 
                                                            
14 The governance indicators reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a 
large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number 
of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. 
CODE VARIABLE UNIT SCALE SOURCE
VAI Voice and Accountability Index Index
Ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes.
World Bank
PSI
Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
Index
Index
Ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes.
World Bank
GEI Government Effectiveness Index Index
Ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes.
World Bank
RQI Regulatory Quality Index Index
Ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes.
World Bank
RLI Rule of Law Index Index
Ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes.
World Bank
CCI Control of Corruption Index Index
Ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes.
World Bank
POP Total Population Hab. 1000 hab. FAO
GDP Gross domestic product, current prices U.S. dollars (Billions) Billion of US$ IMF
GDPPC Gross domestic product per capita, current prices U.S. dollars IMF
GDPPCPPP
Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-
parity (PPP) per capita GDP
Current international dollar IMF
UNEMP Average annual unemployment rate Percentage CEPAL
RURP Rural Population Hab. 1000 hab. FAO
RURPR Rural Population % of total population FAO
EXDBT External Debt US$ Millions of US$ CEPAL
INF Inflation Percentage
Data for inflation are averages for the year, not end-of-
period data.
IMF
CO2 CO2 Emissions per capita metric tons per capita World Bank
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TABLE N° 03 
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
 
 
The introduction of additional explanatory variables into the Basic Model estimation gave also expected 
results since the expected sign and statistically significance of the coefficients related to GDPPC and GDPPC 
squared (GDPPC^2) still leads to confirm the quadratic formulation of the Environmental Kuznets Curve.   
However, it is important to point out that the coefficients from the additional explanatory variables were 
those expected by theory.  The coefficient of RURP (rural population rate) confirms the idea that countries which 
focus their productive activities on the rural sector have less use of labor factor on their industrial sector (the 
pollutant sector).  Moreover, the expected sign of EXDBT (external debt) also confirms the idea that countries with 
higher levels of external debt have more resources to increase their production possibilities and, therefore, increase 
pollution. 
   On the other hand, in the case of unemployment (UNEMP), even though previous empirical studies on 
Environmental Kuznets Curve showed a statistical significance of the coefficient of this variable, we cannot confirm 
the statistical relevance of this variable. 
It is important to highlight that due to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables, the statistical 
significance of the variable INF (inflation) is different in the two versions of the Extended Model.  This could be 
explained by the fact that in Extended Model Nº 1 relevant explanatory variables (institutional variables) were 
omitted which could generate a bias in the estimation and led to accept the null hypothesis of no significance.  The 
positive relationship between inflation rates and CO2 emissions could be explained by the fact that higher inflation 
rates in the short run
15 do have an impact on production.   
Regarding to institutional variables, five of the six coefficients of these variables included in the model 
were statistical significant.  The first main result that should be pointed out is the statistical significance of a 
quadratic relationship between pollution (CO2 emissions) and corruption (measured by the CCI variable) as López 
                                                            
15 Given that the dataset do not have an extensive temporal dimension range, the results obtained do not capture long-
run effects. 
Dependent Variable: CO2 Emissions
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant 0.036332 0.759852 0.053741 0.836159 -0.571314 -4.08082***
GDPPC 0.000839 17.44645*** 0.000908 18.64481*** 0.0007 10.93161***
GDPPC^2 -4.57E-08 -7.154299*** -7.37E-08 -9.084384*** -3.49E-08 -3.012249***
RURP -2.89E-05 -4.003441*** -5.35E-05 -7.85784***
EXDBT 1.12E-05 9.053483*** 1.04E-05 9.940891***
INF 6.30E-06 1.031276 0.007472 6.27357***
UNEMP -0.249857 -0.900385 0.244624 0.321209
CCI -0.501422 -3.302914***
CCI^2 0.745271 9.907683***
PSI -0.104618 -1.779556***
VAI -0.238984 -15.97884***
GEI 0.607658 2.679024***
RQI -0.105945 -1.185813
RLI -0.273657 -2.378383***
WEIGHTED 
STATISTICS
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
UNWEIGHTED 
STATISTICS
R-squared
* Significance at 10%
** Significance at 5%
*** Significance at 1%
BASIC MODEL EXTENDED MODEL Nº 2 EXTENDED MODEL Nº 1
0.664879
464.2624***
0.666314
0.413158 0.6513
0.768356
0.739676
26.79089***
0.748843
0.745378
216.1635***
0.459292
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and Mitra proposed.  This means that countries that make higher efforts to control corruption in the public 
administration tend to improve their environmental quality.   
On the other hand, results did not support the idea proposed by Fredriksson and Svensson
16.  This could be 
explained by the fact that, even though corruption control and political stability in the region are not as good as in 
other developing regions, the level of political instability should not be considered as extremely high as the 
theoretical model propose by these authors.  Furthermore, results showed that an increase in the political stability in 
the region have a statistically positive effect over environmental quality which could be explained by the fact that 
governments with less instability are more concerned on the efficiency of their policies (including environmental 
policies). 
Econometric estimation also helped to support the proposition of Payne which argued that democratic 
governments citizens can express better their environmental concerns and demands, which will in turn increase 
pressure on policy entrepreneurs (operating in a competitive political system) to respond positively to these 
demands.  To test this hypothesis the variable VAI (Voice and Accountability Index) was introduced as an 
explanatory variable and results showed an expected negative significant sign which means that countries which 
have strengthen their democratic mechanisms of representation tend to improve their environmental quality.   
In developing countries the need of increasing production in order to develop and promote employment is 
the main concern of public authorities.  Even though, this does not mean that countries in the region are not 
concerned about environmental quality, the weight of these policies is not equal to those related to economic growth 
promotion.  In this sense, the results for the variable GEI showed that an improvement in government effectiveness 
should be related to efficiency in the allocation of resources (which would lead to an increase in factors 
productivity) and, therefore, to an increase in production which increases also pollution. 
Finally, the impact of public policies on the environmental quality should not only be considered by the 
amount of laws or directives given, but also by the way governments make this regulation accomplish its goals (this 
is what institutional economists usually call “enforcement”). The variable RLI (rule of law index) tried to capture 
this effect obtaining a statistical significant negative effect on environmental quality which means that improvement 
in the enforcement capacity of governments would lead to less CO2 emissions as Deacon and Mueller suggested.  
 
5.1.Comparative analysis 
An important characteristic to analyze on the Environmental Kuznets Curve is related to the estimated 
turning point of the model and how it changes with additional explanatory variables.  The following table shows the 
results of the turning points of the three models. 
 
TABLE N° 04 
ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE TURNING POINT 
 
 
The inclusion of economic variables into the basic Environmental Kuznets Curve (Extended Model Nº 1) 
does have an important impact on the turning point which reduced its value in approximately 35%
 compared to 
Basic Model.  On the other hand, a different outcome was obtained in the Extended Model Nº 2 which showed a 
relative smaller difference with the Basic Model but a relatively higher difference with the Extended Model N° 1. 
The estimation of the Environmental Kuznets Curve with only economic variables (Extended Model Nº 1) 
gave biased estimators which would explain the big difference in the value of the turning point.  Therefore, the 
inclusion of additional explanatory variables related to institutional performance would help to correct the bias and 
reach better results. 
In order to test if the turning points obtained belong to a reasonable range, the estimations were compared 
to a survey
17 of several empirical studies which attempted to estimate the Environmental Kuznets Curve
18.  It is 
important to mention that all these studies have differences between each other due to the use of different measures 
of environmental damages, regions and explanatory variables, therefore, all these results should be taken as relative 
values. 
 
TABLE N° 05 
                                                            
16 That argued that when political instability increases, bribery becomes less attractive for lobbies (because of the 
likelihood that the government remains in office) that seeks to change environmental policies. 
17 For further references see Almeida,E. and Sabadini,T. (2009), Bhattarai,M. and Hammig, M. (2001), 
Brajer et al. (2008), Lee et al. (2010), and Selden et al. (1994). 
18 In order to give an accurate comparative perspective only those studies which used GDP per capita for their 
estimation were  taken into account. 
Basic 
Model
Extended 
Model Nº 1
Extended 
Model Nº 2
Turning Point
(US$) 9,256 6,058 10,109
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SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL ESTUDIES  
 
 
 
From the previous table we can appreciate the results obtained by other authors that do not vary 
considerably from the results of the three models estimated, therefore, we can consider that these turning points 
belong to a reasonable range.  
 
5.2.The impact of institutions on environmental quality 
This section attempts to analyze how do changes in institutional performance indexes affect environmental 
quality through simulations based on the results obtained for the Extended Model Nº 2.  The econometric analysis 
revealed that, even though five of these variables obtained a coefficient value statistically different from zero, not all 
of these variables have the same impact over environmental quality.  In this sense, the most important variables that 
should be considered given the magnitude of their impacts on CO2 emission are CCI (Control of Corruption Index) 
and GEI (Government Efficiency Index).        
Even though the theories of Fredriksson and Svensson (related to the impact of political instability on 
environmental outcome) and Payne (which related voice and accountability performance of the governments with 
better environmental policies) where considered statistically significant, the relative impact on environmental 
outcome of institutional improvement related to this variables is very low. 
On the other hand, referring to corruption control (CCI), it is important to mention that the impact of this 
variable in each of the 18 countries analyzed depends on the relative allocation that each country has (measured by 
CCI index).  Since the variable showed a quadratic form, an improvement of 0.1 units on CCI would leave to higher 
impact on environmental quality for the most corrupt countries than for less corrupt ones.   
Source Author Region Period Dependant 
Variable
Additional 
Explanatory 
Variables
Turning Point
Almeida and 
Sabadini
Moomaw and Unhruh 
(1997)
16 countries 1950-1992 CO2 Emissions none $12,813
Almeida and 
Sabadini
Agras and Chapman
(1999)
34 countries 1971-1989 CO2 Emissions
Trade variables and 
temporally lagged 
dependent variable
$13,630
Almeida and 
Sabadini
Dijkgraaf and 
Vollebergh
(2001)
OECD countries 1960-1997 CO2 Emissions none $15,704 and $13,959
Almeida and 
Sabadini
Almeida and 
Sabadini
167 countries 2000-2004 CO2 emissions
Cubic GDP per 
capita, KPt Kyoto 
Protocol dummy, 
Sum of imports and 
exports (over total 
GDP by country), 
energy consumption 
and population
US$ 10,193.68 and 
US$ 13,484.85
Bhattarai and 
Hammig
Bhattarai and 
Hammig 
(2001)
Latin America 
(20 countries)
1972-1991 Deforestation rate
Political institution 
index (WRI), black 
market foreing 
exchange rate, 
external debt, 
population, rural 
population, change in 
cerial yield index
$ 6,600
Brajer, Mead and Xiao
(2008)
China (128 cities) 1990–2004 SO2 Emission Time trend $ 7,793
Brajer, Mead and Xiao
(2008)
China (128 cities) 1990–2004 SO2 Emission
Time trend, dummy 
for coast zone and 
dummy for cities in 
the north
$ 6,766
Brajer, Mead and Xiao
(2008)
China (128 cities) 1990–2004 SO2 Emission
Time trend, GDP 
cubic
$ 4,765
Brajer, Mead and Xiao
(2008)
China (128 cities) 1990–2004 SO2 Emission
Time trend, GDP 
cubic, dummy for 
coast zone and 
dummy for cities in 
the north
$ 4,429
Lee, Chiu 
and Sun
Lee, Chiu and Sun
(2010)
97 countries 1980-2001 Water Polution
GDP cubic, trade and 
population and 
lagged dependant 
variable
$ 13,956
Selden and Song
(1993)
30 countries
1973-1975, 1979-
1981, 1982-1984
SO2 Emission
Population density 
and period effects 
dummies
$ 10,292 
(1985 US Dollars)
Selden and Song
(1993)
31 countries
1973-1975, 1979-
1981, 1982-1985
SO2 Emission
period effects 
dummies
$ 10, 681 
(1985 US Dollars)
Selden and Song
(1993)
32 countries
1973-1975, 1979-
1981, 1982-1986
CO2 Emission
Population density 
and period effects 
dummies
$ 15,741 
(1985 US Dollars)
Selden and Song
(1993)
33 countries
1973-1975, 1979-
1981, 1982-1987
CO2 Emission
period effects 
dummies
$ 19,092 
(1985 US Dollars)
Brajer, Mead 
and Xiao
Selden and 
Song
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Governments do have an idea of the main benefits of improving institutional performance on economic 
growth; however, few studies have attempted to measure how these improvements affect environmental quality.  
This impact should be considered in policy assessment (additional social benefits from institutional reforms) and as 
a main decision variable when resources from international cooperation are allocated since this decision would not 
only benefit the country that receives cooperation, but also the entire planet that would benefit from the reduction in 
CO2 emissions. 
 
6.Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of institutional quality on environmental outcome.   
Results supported the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis for CO2 emissions by means of three econometric 
models for a panel of 18 Latin American countries.  Therefore, the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between per capita CO2 emissions and per capita gross domestic product is confirmed.  Furthermore, the results 
showed the potential relevance of improvement in institutional performance in the reduction of global amount of 
emitted dioxide carbon.  
The final model selected (Extended Model Nº 2) was considered as the most appropriate to explain the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve theory since it corrected the bias generated by the omission of relevant explanatory 
variables.  Even though the risk of omitted variables cannot be excluded for this estimation, the specification of the 
model follows closely the theory applied to the Environmental Kuznets Curve relationship and, therefore, this risk is 
reduced.   
The main contribution of this research is related to the fact that institutional variables (that measure 
government performance) do have statistical significance and, therefore, should be taken into account in future 
researches.  
Lack of corruption control and other institutional weaknesses affect government’s concerns and control of 
environmental quality, both with important implications to environmental degradation. Therefore, institutional 
reforms that lead to improve quality of government performance would also lead to environmental improvements.  
 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve does not indicate that countries can simply grow out of environmental 
problems, but the understanding of the relationship between income and pollution can contribute to policy making.  
Therefore, the results of this research should be considered in public policy assessment as additional social benefits 
from institutional improvement. 
Moreover, as some developed countries and international institutions help developing countries to improve 
institutional quality, the impacts on environmental performance should also be considered as a social benefit to take 
into account when resources from international cooperation are allocated into developing countries.  Furthermore, 
international cooperation not only would benefit the receptor country but also the entire world, since it will improve 
environmental quality worldwide. 
In sum, economic growth does not guarantee the cure for the world’s environmental problems. Proper 
institutional performances do have a fundamental role in the reduction of greenhouse gases emission in the world. 
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